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Abstract. This article explores the psychology of tit-for-tat reactions in the context of espionage and
counterespionage.
Journalistic accounts have described United States Government (USG) tit-for-tat reactions in the wake of
its public acknowledgement of one of its counterintelligence assets having committed espionage for the
Soviet Union and Russia. According to the accounts, the USG is retaliating against Russia--the Soviet
Union being no longer available to be the brunt of USG wrath--by ordering 4-5 Russian diplomats to
leave the US to be followed by the ouster of an additional 45-50 diplomats. All of these diplomats
purportedly are Russian intelligence assets under soft diplomatic cover.
One can make a strong case that the USG reactions are not supportive of its own interests. First, the
Russian government already has announced a tit-for-tat counter that would order a similar number of
USG representatives to leave Russia. Second--given the assumptions that (a) the USG has a smaller
number of its representatives as intelligence assets in Russia than Russia has in the US and that (b) both
the USG and Russia have close to full knowledge of whom of each others diplomats are intelligence
assets--the tit-for-tat counter may result in a much more significant removal of USG assets than Russian
assets. Third, to maintain similar numbers of expelled government representatives, the Russians also
may order military attaches, law enforcement and aid officials, and other individuals doing the work of
the USG out of Russia. Thus, USG interests can become damaged beyond matters of pure intelligence.
Fourth, USG insistence that its initiation of a tit-for tat reaction is necessary to show independence and
strength in the international arena is obviated by its similarity with a Cold War psychology that
constrained USG responses to tough-looking acts that often weakened USG interests. Fifth, the tit-fortat approach looks like a strong response but actually facilitates a rationalization of an absence of any
significant response against those who might be considered most responsible for USG
counterintelligence assets going bad and staying bad for more than 15 years--viz., certain other USG
counterintelligence and intelligence officials.
Of course, the USG tit-for-tat reaction is nothing of the kind. Given the USG counterintelligence asset
who (allegedly) volunteered to betray his country and the Russians who accepted his largesse, a tit-fortat reaction would involve better increasing the probability that Russians would volunteer to engage in
treason and that such volunteering would be accepted by the USG. In fact, some journalistic accounts
suggest that better USG nurturing of Russian treason led to the very uncovering of the USG
counterintelligence asset who went bad.
Now it must be said that even if a tit-for tat reaction was chosen by the USG, the functional benefits of
that reaction are by no means clear. For example, Sheldon (1999) has shown that the punitive feature of
tit-for-tat is especially important in eliciting enhanced cooperation among opponents. On the other
hand, Van Lange & Visser (1999) have shown that opponents with certain value orientations--e.g.,
competitive--may continue to exhibit low levels of cooperation with a tit-for-tat partner. Although they
also assert that tit-for-tat may decrease interdependence with a competitive opponent, this option may
just not be germane in a globalized world. Carment (1974) has suggested that certain opponents may be
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less likely to even employ tit-for-tat induced cooperative responding, while Lomborg (1996) has posited
that an unforced cooperation approach can engender higher levels of cooperation than the tit-for-tat
approach. Moreover, Betz (1995) has shown that the well-known GRIT (graduated and reciprocated
initiatives in tension reduction) approach (Lindskold, 1978) plus tit-for tat offers no advantages to GRIT
alone in best resolving the Prisoner's Dilemma game. Yet Kuhlman & Marshello (1975) have shown more
support for the benefits of tit-for-tat. And finally, much of the tit-for-tat research employs a prisoner's
dilemma and game perspective that may not accurately characterize intelligence activities and power
politics.
It would seem that the reaction chosen by the USG may be best indicative of the wrong game at the
wrong time. However, in the smoke and mirrors environment of the counterintelligence world, merely
laying out a persuasive case to support this perspective probably will have little effect on future USG
behavior. (See Betz, B. (1995). Comparison of GRIT versus GRIT/Tit-For-Tat. Psychological Reports, 76,
322; Carment, D.W. (1974). Indian and Canadian choice behaviour in a maximizing difference game and
in a game of chicken. International Journal of Psychology, 9, 213-221; Kuhlman, D.M., & Marshello, A.F.
(1975). Individual differences in game motivation as moderators of preprogrammed strategy effects in
prisoner's dilemma. Journal of Personality and Social Psychology, 32, 922-931; Lindskold, S. (1978). Trust
development, the GRIT proposal, and the effects of conciliatory acts on conflict and cooperation.
Psychological Bulletin, 85, 772-793; Lomborg, B. (1996). Nucleus and shield: The evolution of social
structure in the iterated prisoner's dilemma. American Sociological Research, 61, 278-307; Risen, J. &
Perlez, J. (March 22, 2001). Russian diplomats ordered expelled in a countermove. The New York Times,
http://www.nytimes.com; Sheldon, K.M. (1999). Learning the lessons of tit-for-tat: Even competitors can
get the message. Journal of Personality and Social Psychology, 77, 1245-1253; Tyler, P.E. (March 24,
2001). Russia expels 4 Americans and vows 'other measures.' The New York Times, p. A4; Van Lange,
P.A.M., & Visser, K. (1999). Locomotion in social dilemmas: How people adapt to cooperative, tit-for-tat,
and non-cooperative partners. Journal of Personality and Social Psychology, 77, 762-773.) (Keywords:
Counterintelligence, Espionage, Tit-For-Tat.)
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